Opinion Before Pahalgam: What past attacks tell us about the convoluted logic of terror

The Commission analysed 10 “operational opportunities” from January 2000 to August 2001 and concluded that the CIA and FBI failed to recognise danger to the US by way of multiple attacks on September 11, 2001. A similar methodology was adopted by our 26/11 high level enquiry committee of which I was the second member.

Did we fail to recognise the danger from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pahalgam after what seemed to be a notable victory for India with the extradition of Tahawwur Rana who arrived in India on April 10? Terrorists operate with a different logic than others. Dazzling attacks unify their cadres, raise their international profile and boost funding, as happened after 26/11. Also, they would be most reluctant to admit defeat on such an important operation as 26/11 over which they had spent so much time and money as the following history would indicate.

It is now well known that Tahawwur Hussain Rana was an important member of the ISI’s conspiracy against India, outsourced to LeT. The Headley papers, as seen in the US courts and in the media, indicate how David Coleman Headley and Tahawwur Rana had performed a “valse a deux temps” throughout, culminating in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks and the October 2009 Denmark plots.

Rana’s name appears 33 times in Headley’s plea agreement at the United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division for aiding abetting these conspiracies at different places, including India.

Since 2003, Headley had kept the LeT leadership informed of different stages of conspiracy like opening a “cover” immigration office in Mumbai owned by Rana, which he used for his trips to India to choose targets, fixing GPS coordinates, landing sites. Headley also used to personally and continuously brief Rana in Chicago on the selection of targets in Mumbai, like the Taj Mahal Hotel. In other words, Rana was as much a foot soldier of LeT as Headley.

How does Jammu and Kashmir come in this scheme? For this we need to read other Headley-Lashkar papers released in the public domain by intrepid writers like Stephen Tankel and Sebastian Rotella, which prove that wresting J&K from India was the basic aim of the Lashkar (and the ISI), long before Pakistan Army chief General Asim Munir described Kashmir as Islamabad’s “jugular vein”.

The 26/11 investigation papers had revealed that the Lashkar’s aim was to bleed India by hitting Mumbai, its financial capital. According to its convoluted logic, India’s financial power to hold on to Jammu and Kashmir came from Mumbai and a dazzling attack on that city would make India a less attractive investment destination.

Tankel, who had presented a composite history after interviewing American and Pakistani sources, says in his Storming the World Stage (2011) that Headley went to Lashkar in 2001 to join the “Kashmir jihad” but was given only surveillance duties by Sajid Mir, as he was too old. For Lashkar he was the ideal recruit as he possessed a US passport with which he could travel to India. At the same time, Headley was also in close contact with Abdur Rehman Syed, a retired army officer who was in and out of Lashkar.

Headley’s association with ISI started in 2006, when he was detained after being seen with smuggling contacts. He was interrogated by one Major Samir Ali who introduced him to a Major Iqbal. It was Major Iqbal who funded his surveillance trip to India. This twin control by Sajid and Major Iqbal worked throughout, and Headley also gave separate reports including memory sticks of his surveillance separately to Lashkar and ISI.

By 2007, Headley was working for three handlers: Sajid Mir of the official Lashkar, Syed, a dissident Lashkar and Major Iqbal of the ISI! Each wanted to hit different targets. Sajid wanted to strike the Taj Palace hotel where a software professionals’ meeting was going to be held, while Major Iqbal wanted him to visit targets in Pune’s military installations. Syed wanted him to visit the National Defence College, New Delhi for surveillance.

According to Headley, Lashkar wanted to do an operation in India to divert the attention of its cadres when fierce ideological debates started erupting on whether they should target India on Kashmir or target Afghanistan to launch a global jihad. A meeting was held in Muzaffarabad in March 2008 where a maritime infiltration was decided upon. A naval “frogman” who was present asked Headley to avoid Indian naval ships before entering Indian waters. Sajid taught him how to plot locations on GPS.

In Lahore, he met Major Iqbal who knew about these plans. However, Iqbal asked him to survey the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre during his next trip to examine how to hit its residential colony as a target. This idea was given up in view of Indo-Pakistan bilateral agreement not to attack their nuclear installations. Still, in April 2008, Headley went around the installations on a hired boat and took videos of the Mumbai coast. In late June, Sajid asked him to return to Mumbai to visit Chabad House, which was locally known as Nariman House, as a Jewish target.

A Pakistan-based Western diplomat told Tankel that the 26/11 attack led to “a boost in the influx of money and men” for Lashkar. It raised the group’s international profile, with copycat attacks elsewhere. Could the same thing happen after the Pahalgam attack?

The writer is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat. Views are personal