Opinion Pratap Bhanu Mehta writes: Dealing with Pakistan, weak or strong
Immediate onus is on Pakistan to demonstrate commitment to pacification of terrorism. There is no avoiding political process in Subcontinent
Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) Lt General Rajiv Ghai with Air Marshal AK Bharti and Vice Admiral AN Pramod during a press conference on 'Operation Sindoor', in New Delhi, (PTI Photo)
May 12, 2025 10:40 AM IST
First published on: May 12, 2025 at 07:20 AM IST
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The temporary ceasefire between India and Pakistan announced by US President Donald Trump is to be welcomed. It may yet prove fragile. But peace ought seldom to be sneered at; and it ought not to be held hostage to pride. The current round of conflict, precipitated by an act of terrorism at Pahalgam, put India and Pakistan on a dangerous logic of escalation. In modern war, seldom does any side prevail decisively, no matter how much armchair theorists fantasise about escalation dominance. Imagine that, even if accidentally, if there had been an episode of high civilian casualties on either side, how difficult it would have been to claw back. Just imagine, further, an escalation in the use of missiles, with air defences panicking over what kind of warheads a missile might be carrying. In such scenarios, all bets would have been off.
India was within its rights to take prudent retaliatory action. But we should also dispassionately analyse where Operation Sindoor has got us. That would be the only genuine tribute to those who risk their lives for the nation. The truth is, that so far, the operation did not get us very far. It has not degraded Pakistan’s military infrastructure enough to ensure that Pakistan will not pose a threat in the future. If we crossed a Rubicon by striking military facilities in their heartland, so has Pakistan demonstrated the potential of drone warfare. In fact, this war is more interesting as a probing ground for new technologies and disinformation systems in warfare, a frontline experiment between weapons systems of different arms suppliers. India and Pakistan have demonstrated that both have limited room for imposing costs on each other, without risking major catastrophe. This is perhaps, in the end, what keeps the fragile peace on the Subcontinent. This is not a comment on India’s military capabilities; it is just the structural logic of the nature of war between most adversaries in modern times. India can show its superior might but it cannot dominate its adversaries enough to achieve its objectives. Even powers like Russia and America have not been able to achieve that kind of dominance against so many weaker adversaries.
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More importantly, war without a clear political objective always has limits. What was the political objective? To impose prohibitive costs on Pakistan? But that proved difficult. Some in India had this fantasy of weakening Pakistan to the point of breaking it up. But even if we indulge this fantasy for a moment, what is the political objective in this breaking up? Can we, or anyone, manage the disorder that might follow? It is also a plain misreading of our situation.
The nature of terrorism is that both the strong and weak can deploy it in full measure; the weak even more so. This is the dilemma we have been wrestling with. We can take some consolation from the fact that it will now be understood that any act of terror by Pakistan is an act of war. But this is a formal consolation. The dispute has always been on Pakistan taking responsibility for terror, not whether terror is an act of war. So, in the end, with Pakistan weak or strong, there is no avoiding a political process in the Subcontinent. But the dilemma is that this war does not compel negotiations. Nor is it likely to build even a modicum of trust that can allow a political negotiation. The glaring political vacuum that enables this sore will remain. This is not India’s fault. But this is ground reality.
The question is: Where does India stand diplomatically? In the short run, India has turned the clock back. An armed conflict with no decisive victory and no clear political end simply reinstates the India-Pakistan hyphenation. In the end, the world has little patience with who is right and who is wrong in the Subcontinent, if the war carries nuclear risk. Second, India’s strategic autonomy has been considerably reduced.
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The unwritten text of this war is that South Asia is now once again the frontier of whatever new “cold war” might emerge: The China-Pakistan axis is solid, and the Chinese once again missed an opportunity to imaginatively engage India. In a context where the Sino-Russian axis is strong, and Europe is chafing at India shuffling its feat on Ukraine, India is now more dependent on the US — something that has been evident in the Narendra Modi government’s courting of Trump. So, the two things India has always endeavoured to avoid — making the Subcontinent a frontline state, and asserting its strategic autonomy — are now compromised. India is not in charge of its region. And it will be increasingly more dependent on the West. Conflict in the Subcontinent will be the wedge used to put India in its place. We are more vulnerable now than a decade ago.
Pakistan also ought to draw the right conclusion. The first, that India stopped the war in part because it has more to lose; its growth potential is still considerable, and this gap will only grow. But it will be foolish for Pakistan to think that the present stalemate is necessarily a guide to the future. If the only thing keeping Pakistan together is anti-India sentiment, and the use of terror as an instrument, it will constantly shortchange its own people. India’s biggest strength in this crisis was a demonstration that Pakistan cannot exploit communal divisions within India. But our politically dominant ecosystem is doing its best still to assault India’s greatest strength. Disinformation and ideology are no substitute for solid economic and technological power. In this area, we have been consistently overestimating our relevance to the world.
But this ceasefire will be worth it, if having satiated domestic political narratives, both sides can free themselves of the embers of 1947 that are still singeing us. The immediate onus is on Pakistan to demonstrate a commitment to the pacification of terrorism. There is also no dearth of sensible proposals for an honourable agreement between India and Pakistan. But India and Pakistan are not a conventional international-relations problem.
It is an inner conflict of a civilisation with layers of psychological sediment that have deformed our collective future. There are few credible political forces on either side that can help us overcome our inner demons. From this fragile ceasefire, will a new light emerge or will our darkest inner demons overcome us again? This may be the only question that matters. The omens, especially in Pakistan, do not look good.
Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) Lt General Rajiv Ghai with Air Marshal AK Bharti and Vice Admiral AN Pramod during a press conference on 'Operation Sindoor', in New Delhi, (PTI Photo) 
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India was within its rights to take prudent retaliatory action. But we should also dispassionately analyse where Operation Sindoor has got us. That would be the only genuine tribute to those who risk their lives for the nation. The truth is, that so far, the operation did not get us very far. It has not degraded Pakistan’s military infrastructure enough to ensure that Pakistan will not pose a threat in the future. If we crossed a Rubicon by striking military facilities in their heartland, so has Pakistan demonstrated the potential of drone warfare. In fact, this war is more interesting as a probing ground for new technologies and disinformation systems in warfare, a frontline experiment between weapons systems of different arms suppliers. India and Pakistan have demonstrated that both have limited room for imposing costs on each other, without risking major catastrophe. This is perhaps, in the end, what keeps the fragile peace on the Subcontinent. This is not a comment on India’s military capabilities; it is just the structural logic of the nature of war between most adversaries in modern times. India can show its superior might but it cannot dominate its adversaries enough to achieve its objectives. Even powers like Russia and America have not been able to achieve that kind of dominance against so many weaker adversaries.
