Opinion Towards a new Asian order

These growing Asian powers increasingly owe more and more of their economic growth to the links and interdependence among themselves. Several of them still have overwhelming domestic preoccupations and will therefore concentrate on those rather than on external entanglements. It would be natural to expect that these powers would concentrate on creating external environments conducive to their continued economic growth and social transformation rather than focussing purely on security aspects of their external environment. For quite some time to come Asia will see the development of powerful states whose citizenry as individuals will enjoy lower standards of living than those in the developed world. These states will therefore not replicate the behaviour of previous powers. The new equilibrium in Asia is likely to be as much a result of production chains and regional and global market integration as of purely security driven alliances or structures.

Asia’s geopolitics are complicated by the presence of several global and extra-regional powers who are now integral to Asian security in this age of globalisation of economics,security and technology. Powers such as the USA,Russia and Japan are present and have long established interests of their own in Asia. An Asian order which ignores their interests is unlikely to be stable.

And lastly,Asia as a whole is and will remain dependent upon the rest of the world for its own continued growth and security,whether in terms of energy security,food security or,in the more conventional calculation of the sources and providers of security capabilities and technologies. In several respects that matter,(concepts,technology,security,energy etc),Asia is still and will remain a net global consumer for some time to come. With younger populations,and the task of maintaining the growth necessary to generate jobs for new entrants to the labour force,this will remain true of the major Asian developing economies for the foreseeable future.

In other words,we are speaking of an Asia that will be largely developing,increasingly integrated within itself,and simultaneously dependent upon the broader global community and environment,—- a powerful but poor Asia.

None of this is to say that the relative rise of Asia will not continue. I would expect it to over the medium term,though straight line extrapolations have seldom worked in history. This is just to say that the issues that we face in dealing with the changes in Asia are different from those that we see in historical analogies of rising powers in the past. (This is not 19th century Europe,amenable to balance of power solutions such as a “Concert of Asia”.) For the present,Asia and the world have yet to work out a security architecture that accommodates the changes in Asia and the legitimate interests of all the countries concerned without reducing them to a zero sum game. Our preference is that the new architecture be open,inclusive,and flexible. But this still is a work in progress.

What are the new challenges that this situation in Asia throws up for us? To my mind three challenges stand out:

1. Connectivity domains like maritime security,cyber space and outer space;

2. The increasing security divide within Asia; and,

3. The institutionalisation of security cooperation in Asia.

You might well ask why I also mentioned the security divide and a lack of institutions. Why not choose traditional security issues like border disputes or terrorism or inter-state conflict or nuclear proliferation? Because these problems,though very real and worrying,which exist in virulent forms in Asia,have not prevented the stupendous transformation that has resulted in the accumulation of power and wealth in large parts of Asia that we spoke of. In other words,so far Asia has successfully managed individual issues of nuclear balance and several conventional security threats,and even the proliferation of WMD and missile technologies. These will require continued and considerable effort,but increasingly these problems will occur in new forms…

To take (an) instance,there is an increasing danger of terrorism spreading from those parts of Asia,like Pakistan and Afghanistan,which have not been part of the Asian economic miracle. The security of nuclear materials and weapons in those same parts of Asia is another example of the sort of problems that we face. These are the problems I mean when I speak of the increasing security divide within Asia. There are parts of Asia which are falling behind,not just in economic terms but in terms of the normal security attributes of sovereignty that we take for granted. And the consequences for Asian security should concern all of us in Asia.

So what sort of new Asian order will meet the needs of these new challenges?

It should be inclusive. Given the diversity in Asia this is essential if the order is to work. And it must include all relevant powers,including those geographically external but intrinsic to Asia’s security in practice and presence.

It should be extensive,from Suez to the Pacific and including the entire Eurasian landmass. If not it will not be able to address the security consequences of the growing security divide within Asia.

It should be plural. No one-size solution or simplistic prescription will work. We should learn from the failure of Cold War alliance systems in the area,and of earlier Asian Collective Security proposals.

Its institutions should be consultative,respecting the Asian cultural bias towards consensual solutions. Centring the institutions on ASEAN would be logical and practical,and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ plus Eight Meeting offers a potentially very useful way forward.

Excerpted from a talk by National
Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon,at the 13th Asian Security Conference on February 18 at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses