Opinion The control panel

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has, with one stroke of his pen, abolished the nine empowered groups of ministers (EGoMs) and the 21 groups of ministers (GoMs) that had carried on from the previous government. This was meant to directly empower ministries and departments, with the cabinet secretariat and prime minister’s office stepping in to resolve differences and help decision-making. It is clear that Modi intends to govern as he campaigned, in a presidential manner, concentrating authority within a small core team. This approach has its own potential downside, but it will certainly be a change from the shuffling pace of the previous government.

GoMs and EGoMs are, in concept, meant as forums to coordinate various ministry positions, and are particularly useful for coalition governments to ensure a common agenda at all times. Under the UPA, though, these working groups had come to exemplify delay, argument and buck-passing under the cover of collective decision-making. They had proliferated to over 80 at one point, and some of them had never met. They included minor matters that fell between ministries, more complex ones that required ministries to reconcile their differences, and even mundane matters like post-retirement medical schemes and superannuation age debates for public sector workers. An extraordinary number of EGoMs was headed by party veterans like Pranab Mukherjee and A.K. Antony. With no timeline to come to a decision, they became a way to vacillate on a policy decision while appearing to work on it. Without a clear central will, this charade of consultation and deliberation quickly degenerated.

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Modi, as the head of a remarkably strong government, and assured of the support of his party and allies, can dispense with what he considers administrative encumbrances. While his resolve is undeniable, as is his incentive to make quick decisions given the weight of expectations on him, there could be pitfalls to a system where decision-making capacity is left primarily to one all-seeing super-PMO. Modi’s office must be careful not to whittle away the power of ministries or to lead by commanding. The cabinet system envisages decisions by consensus, and the PMO should see itself as coordinating and using the levers of persuasion it has, rather than taking over as arbiter of disputes and the final word. Robust decisions depend on distributed intelligence, rather than a single point of power. Modi must see himself as the listener-in-chief, rather than the decider-in-chief, if his centralised administrative approach is to succeed.